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Defence Participation through Pre-Trial Disclosure: Issues and Implications 




The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 imposed, for the first time in the history of English 
criminal procedure, a general duty on the defence to disclose the details of its case ahead of trial.  These 
disclosure requirements have been augmented by the case management provisions of the Criminal 
Procedure Rules and judicial responses to the perceived need to tackle ambush defences. The defence 
disclosure regime has changed the role of the defence as a participant in the criminal process. It raises 
issues of principle in terms of its effect on fair trial rights and has implications for the nature of English 
criminal procedure. This article examines these issues and implications; it reveals that the defence 
disclosure regime has caused a shift in the English criminal process further away from an adversarial 
style contest towards a participatory model of procedure.  
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Prior to the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA), the defendant was under no general 
duty to disclose his case before trial.1 This position could be justified as a reflection of the principle that 
the defendant need not respond until the prosecution have established a prima facie case in court.2 
Broad prosecution disclosure obligations are easy to justify: they are a means of ensuring fairness and 
redressing an inequality of arms.3 However, the CPIA restricted prosecution disclosure obligations. 
When it was introduced, some saw the Act as responding to complaints by the police that prosecution 
disclosure had become too generous.4 Under the common law, and subject to public interest immunity, 
the defence had access to all possibly relevant prosecution material.5 The CPIA limits disclosure to 
material which might reasonably be capable of undermining the case for the prosecution or of assisting 
the case for the accused.6 At the same time, the CPIA imposed new and radical duties on the defence. 
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The most significant element of the legislation, for the purposes of this article, is the requirement for the 
defence to provide a statement which sets out the details of its case. Failure to comply with the 
legislation is penalised at trial through provisions which permit adverse comment to be made and 
adverse inferences to be drawn against the defendant. These may contribute to a finding of guilt. 
This article argues that the defence disclosure regime affects the nature of criminal procedure by 
contributing to the emergence of a participatory model; it raises also significant issues of principle. 
Although it has become increasingly recognised that England and Wales do not subscribe to a purely 
adversarial model of procedure,7 the English system remains associated with adversarialism. The 
adversarial trial takes the form of a contest between two sides. The prosecution and defence control the 
case by defining the issues and gathering the evidence to be presented. The prosecution must prove 
guilt and the system is structured to promote reliability of evidence, fairness and equality between 
parties. The defendant is generally free to take a passive role whilst his counsel presents his case or tests 
the pƌoseĐutioŶ͛s Đase.8 However, a lack of defendant participation is not conducive to efficiency, with 
regard to administration concerns. Nor is it consistent with a crime control perspective of criminal 
procedure ͚ďased oŶ the pƌopositioŶ that the ƌepƌessioŶ of ĐƌiŵiŶal ĐoŶduĐt is ďǇ faƌ the ŵost 
important function to be performed by the criminal process.͛9 Over the past couple of decades in 
particular, there has been a good deal of ͚tough oŶ Đƌiŵe͛ aŶd ͚ƌeďalaŶĐiŶg the sǇsteŵ͛ ƌhetoƌiĐ,10 along 
with concern over the use of efficient time and resources within the criminal justice system.11 This has 
led to laws and practices which, in an attempt to increase efficiency and convictions, have affected the 
defeŶdaŶt͛s aďilitǇ to Đhoose ǁhetheƌ oƌ Ŷot to paƌtiĐipate iŶ the ĐƌiŵiŶal pƌoĐess.12  
 
The disclosure obligations placed on the defence under the CPIA are part of this wider procedural trend 
to secure the participation of the defendant as an individual and the defence as a party. These 
obligations have been augmented by the case management provisions of the Criminal Procedure Rules 
and a judicial disdain for ambush defences. By creating an expectation that the defence should 
participate constructively, the criminal process is shifting further away from an adversarial style contest 
toǁaƌds ǁhat seeŵs to ďe a Ŷeǁ paƌtiĐipatoƌǇ ŵodel of pƌoĐeduƌe. Hoǁeǀeƌ, the defeŶĐe͛s Ŷeǁ 
participatory role raises questions about the enforceability of certain fair trial rights. This article begins 
by examining the requirements placed on the defence to disclose its case ahead of trial under the CPIA, 
followed by the case management provisions of the Criminal Procedure Rules. The issues of principle 
arising from the defence disclosure regime are then discussed. Finally, it assesses its implications for the 





Defence disclosure under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 
 
The defeŶĐe͛s disĐlosuƌe oďligatioŶs ĐaŶ ďe fouŶd iŶ seĐtioŶs ϱ aŶd ϲ of the CPIA. “eĐtioŶ ϱ pƌoǀides that 
the accused must give a defence statement to the court and the prosecutor. This must be done once the 
prosecution has purported to have complied with their initial disclosure obligations under s.3. Section3 
requires the prosecution to disclose any material which might reasonably be considered capable of 
undermining the case for the prosecution against the accused or of assisting the case for the accused. 
Section 7A puts the prosecution under a duty of continuous disclosure; they must keep under review 
whether there is any evidence capable of undermining the prosecution case or assisting the defence.  
 
The current statutory regime for the content of defence statements was inserted by the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 (CJA) and can be found in s.6A. It provides that: 
(1) For the purposes of this Part a defence statement is a written statement -  
(a) settiŶg out the Ŷatuƌe of the aĐĐused͛s defence, including any particular defences on which he 
intends to rely; 
(b) indicating the matters of fact on which he takes issue with the prosecution; 
(c) setting out, in the case of each such matter, why he takes issue with the prosecution;  
(ca) setting out the particulars of the matters of fact on which he intends to rely for the purposes of his      
defence; and 
(d) indicating any point of law (including any point as to the admissibility of evidence or an abuse of 
process) that he wishes to take, and any authority on which he intends to rely for that purpose. 
 
The provision ƌeƋuiƌes the aĐĐused to ͚speĐifǇ his defeŶĐe ǁith paƌtiĐulaƌitǇ.͛13 Where the defendant has 
no positive case to advance at trial, the defence statement must say that the defendant does not admit 
the offence and calls the Crown to prove it. It should also say that he advances no positive case.14 If he is 
going to advance a positive case that must appear in the defence statement and notice must be given. 
Subsection (2) provides that a defence statement which discloses an alibi must give particulars of it, 
including the name, address and date of birth of any alibi witnesses. Section 6B creates a duty of 
updated defence disclosure where the accused has given a defence statement before prosecution 
disclosure. It requires the accused to provide an updated defence statement or a written statement that 




Section 6C provides for the disclosure of the names, addresses and dates of birth of all defence 
witnesses, and s.6D (which is not yet in force) requires disclosure of the names and addresses of experts 
consulted by the defence, but not used. Whilst the general requirement to produce a defence statement 
is only mandatory in the Crown Court, compliance with section 6C is ĐoŵpulsoƌǇ iŶ the ŵagistƌates͛ 
court. Section 6E, like sections 6C and 6D, was inserted by the CJA 2003. It provides that, unless the 
contrary is proved, defence statements will be deemed to have been given with the authority of the 
accused. The effect of s.6E is that, even if the accused has not signed the statement, it will be regarded 
as his statement made by his authorised agent. It is, therefore, admissible as part of the prosecution 
Đase if it ĐoŶtaiŶs adŵissioŶs oƌ iŶĐoŶsisteŶĐies ǁith the aĐĐused͛s testimony at trial, and he may be 
cross-examined on it.15 
 
Where there is a dispute as to whether the defence statement has been given with the authority of the 
aĐĐused, the aĐĐused ďeaƌs the ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ aŶd ďuƌdeŶ of shoǁiŶg that it is Ŷot ͚his͛ stateŵent. The 
burden will not be discharged by the fact that he has not signed the statement, and denies having seen 
it.16  In Haynes, it was suggested that the defendant should have called his solicitors or the person from 
whom initial instructions had been taken to disprove that the statement was his.17 If the defendant 
cannot convince the court that it is not his statement, the prosecution may be able to use it against him 
and it may become difficult to escape adverse inferences being drawn. Thus, whilst section 6E is unlikely 
to change the fact that it is defence lawyers who generally take responsibility for disclosure, it has made 
it easier to penalise the defendant for disclosure failures. Section 6E has also increased the pressure on 
the defendant to participate in the criminal process, by either co-operating in the disclosure exercise 
prior to the trial or by actively proving that the statement is not his at the trial. 
 
IŶ ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ to the defeŶdaŶt͛s pƌeǀious positioŶ of geŶeƌallǇ Ŷot ďeiŶg ƌeƋuiƌed to disĐlose any 
information before the trial, the CPIA has placed what are arguably vast and detailed participatory 
obligations upon him. An effect of this is to shift the roles of the parties away from adversarialism. It has 
become increasingly difficult for the defendant to take a passive role and for the defence, as a party, to 
test the prosecution͛s case, since they must now supply information which has the potential to assist the 
prosecution in building its case. The Court of Appeal has made it clear that it is not open to lawyers to 
advise their clients not to give a defence statement.18 Furthermore, in the Review of Disclosure 
Obligations in Criminal Proceedings, undertaken by Lord Justice Gross for the Judiciary of England and 
Wales, it was suggested that, in appropriate cases, the court should press for involvement from the 
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defendant personally in the disclosure process.19 The report also stated that ͚a defeŶĐe ƌefusal to 
engage in the disclosure process, coupled with persistent sniping at its suggested inadequacies, is 
unacceptable - aŶd ƌefleĐts a Đultuƌe ǁith ǁhiĐh the sǇsteŵ should Ŷot ƌest ĐoŶteŶt.͛20  
 
Defence disclosure is enforced through s.11 of the CPIA under which failure to disclose a defence 
statement, late disclosure, or departure from the statement can result in adverse comment and adverse 
inferences.21 These can be drawn in deciding whether the defendant is guilty and, thus, can contribute 
to a finding of guilt. In the case of Essa,22 a claim that no defence statement had been given on the basis 
of legal advice did not prevent the prosecution from making comments and raising the issue in cross-
examination. The jury had been entitled to take the absence of a defence statement into account in 
determining guilt. In Rochford,23 a judge at a plea and case management hearing attempted to extend 
the penalties by imposing a 28-day sentence of imprisonment for contempt of court against a defendant 
who had submitted an uninformative defence statement. However, the Court of Appeal recognised that 
the sanctions for non-cooperation are confined to those in s.11 and it is not until the case has gone 
before a jury that the court can determine whether an uninformative statement breaches s.6A.  
 
Whilst Loƌd JustiĐe Gƌoss͛s ƌepoƌt has ƌeĐoŵŵeŶded scant tolerance of late or uninformative defence 
statements, in practice, judges have made little use of s.11. This is evidenced by the lack of reported 
cases dealing with the circumstances in which adverse inferences may be drawn from non-disclosure, 
when compared to that concerning adverse inferences drawn from silence under the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994.24 This is so even though the CPIA had been found to work poorly, with many 
defence statements lacking the required detail.25 Judges seem most concerned with the inadequacy of 
defence statements from a managerial point of view, and it makes little sense to invite adverse 
inferences of guilt on the basis that non-disclosure interferes with efficiency. However, the Lord Chief 
Justice has asked Lord Justice Gross and Mr Justice Treacy to conduct a review of sanctions for 
disclosure failures. The review will consider whether the current sanctions are adequate to secure 
compliance with disclosure duties, and whether there are options to strengthen those sanctions.26 This 
may lead to a greater number of defendants becoming the subject of penalty for their non-participation 
in the near future.  
 
 




The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, whose 1993 report formed the basis for the disclosure 
provisions of the CPIA, supported defence disclosure for largely pragmatic reasons.27 Amongst other 
efficiency benefits, it was thought that defence disclosure would reduce the number of ambush 
defences.28 The courts had also become increasingly concerned with the use of ambush defences and 
advocated a managerialist approach to criminal procedure which requires the early and active 
participation of the defence. In Gleeson,29 a case in which the defence had waited until the end of the 
prosecution case to raise a point of law in support of a submission of no case to answer, the Court of 
Appeal stated that: 
[A] prosecution should not be frustrated by errors of the prosecutor, unless such errors have 
immediately rendered a fair trial for the defendant impossible. For the defence advocates to 
seek to take advantage of such errors by deliberately delaying identification of an issue of fact or 
law in the case until the last possible moment is, in our view, no longer acceptable, given the 
legislative and procedural changes to our criminal justice process in recent years.30 
 
This new line of thinking, which affects the role of the defence, was reinforced by the Criminal 
Procedure Rules. The Rules first came into force in 2005 and have effeĐted a ͚sea ĐhaŶge͛ iŶ the ǁaǇ 
cases should be constructed.31 One way in which they have effected this sea change is through the 
overriding objective that criminal cases be dealt with justly.32 This is followed by a list of seven factors, 
including acquitting the innocent and convicting the guilty, and dealing with cases efficiently and 
expeditiously. Each participant in the case must prepare and conduct the case in accordance with the 
overriding objective.33  
 
Pƌioƌ to the CPIA aŶd the ƌise of ŵaŶageƌialisŵ, theƌe ǁeƌe feǁeƌ ĐoŶstƌaiŶts oŶ the defeŶĐe͛s aďilitǇ to 
puƌsue ǁhat ǁas iŶ the defeŶdaŶt͛s ďest iŶteƌest, foƌ eǆaŵple, ďǇ ƌelǇiŶg oŶ a poiŶt of law in support of 
a submission of no case to answer at the close of the prosecution case. The Criminal Procedure Rules 
indicate that the defeŶĐe͛s pƌiŵaƌǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶ should Ŷot just be to win its own case, but also to ensure 
that the guilty are convicted and that the case is dealt with efficiently. This is inconsistent with a 
traditional adversarial role in which, subject to the ethical position of the defence lawyer, the defence 
serve to zealously represent the interests of the accused. As noted by McEwan, defence disclosure 
confronts lawyers with some challenging questions of professional ethics in terms of the competing 




There is a link between the defence disclosure obligations under the CPIA and the case management 
provisions found in Part 3 of the Rules. Case management includes early identification of the issues,35 
and Rule 3.3 requires the parties to actively assist the court in fulfilling its case management duties. 
Although most disclosure obligations under the CPIA are mandatory only in the Crown Court, these case 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt pƌoǀisioŶs aƌe eƋuallǇ appliĐaďle iŶ the ŵagistƌates͛ Đouƌt. The defeŶĐe ĐaŶ, theƌefoƌe, be 
required to reveal details of its case prior to summary trials. Rule 3.10(a) provides that in order to 
ŵaŶage a tƌial oƌ appeal ͚the Đouƌt ŵust estaďlish, ǁith the aĐtiǀe assistaŶĐe of the paƌties, ǁhat aƌe the 
disputed issues.͛ Rule 3.10 allows the court to place participatory requirements on the parties, including 
requirements to identify points of law the parties intend to raise and information about witnesses and 
the order of their evidence. The courts have tended to take their case management role seriously and, 
following Gleeson, have made much of the changing nature of the criminal process, particularly in 
regards to defence tactics designed to ambush the prosecution.36 The court in R (on the application of 
Firth) v Epping Magistrates’ Court confirmed that the Criminal Procedure Rules reflect a new approach 
to the administration of criminal justice, in which both sides, rather than the prosecution alone, are 
required to disclose the nature of their case well before trial.37  
 
Despite the courts͛ seemingly relaxed approach to enforcement of the CPIA through adverse comment 
and inferences, they have been willing to penalise failures to comply with the Rules. In Musone,38 a 
defeŶdaŶt͛s failuƌe to giǀe ŶotiĐe of iŶteŶtioŶ to iŶtƌoduĐe eǀideŶĐe of a co-defeŶdaŶt͛s ďad ĐhaƌaĐteƌ 
under Rule 35.5 resulted in exclusion of the evidence. More recently, in SVS Solicitors,39 a wasted costs 
oƌdeƌ ǁas upheld agaiŶst a soliĐitoƌs͛ fiƌŵ ǁho opposed a pƌoseĐutioŶ appliĐatioŶ to adduĐe heaƌsaǇ 
evidence without setting out their grounds for doing so, in contravention of Rule 34.3(2)(d). This led to 
the unnecessary expense of flying a prosecution witness in from Australia. The court held that, if their 
client would not allow them to comply with the Rules, the solicitors should have withdrawn from the 
case. They owed a duty to the court and were not entitled to break the Rules in order to act on their 
ĐlieŶt͛s iŶstƌuĐtioŶs. No defeŶĐe stateŵeŶt had ďeeŶ seƌǀed iŶ this Đase uŶtil the fiƌst daǇ of tƌial aŶd 
the numerous judges who conducted the pre-trial hearings had commented on this. This case provides 
an example of how lawyers may be confronted with challenging questions of professional ethics, in 
terms of the competing interests of court and client. It now seems that defence lawyers are expected to 
act in the interests of the administration of justice rather than the interests of their clients. Again, this is 




The JudiĐiaƌǇ͛s Đase ŵaŶageŵeŶt ƌole has ďeeŶ desĐƌiďed as ͚of the fiƌst iŵpoƌtaŶĐe͛ foƌ the pƌopeƌ 
operation of the disclosure regime.40  Loƌd JustiĐe Gƌoss͛s Review of Disclosure in Criminal Proceedings 
advocates robust case management of disclosure matters by the judiciary, and believes there is 
undoubted room for improvement in judicial performance in this area.41 The judge should take 
advantage of the provisions for case management, and the Review envisages the judge insisting on 
responsible engagement from the defence in the disclosure exercise, including the early identification of 
the principal disputed issues in the proceedings.42 As a result of the CPIA, the Criminal Procedure Rules, 
and the judicial approach to case management, it now seems that the defendant as an individual and 
the defence as a party are expected to participate constructively in the criminal process. They must 
disclose the nature of their case in terms of both facts they rely on and facts they take issue with, and 
points of law they rely on as well as points of law they take issue with. They may be penalised for 
surprising the prosecution with a defence at trial, and are no longer at liberty to take advantage of 
prosecution errors.  
 
 
Issues of principle and a ͚no-assistance͛ approach 
 
IŶ his disseŶt fƌoŵ the ‘oǇal CoŵŵissioŶ͛s pƌoposals, )aŶdeƌ stated that defeŶĐe disĐlosuƌe is ͚desigŶed 
to be helpful to the prosecution and, more generally, to the system. But it is not the job of the 
defendant to be helpful either to the prosecution or to the system. His task, if he chooses to put the 
proseĐutioŶ to pƌoof, is siŵplǇ to defeŶd hiŵself.͛43 Having outlined the defence disclosure obligations, 
this article will now turn to some of the matters of principle that they raise. The requirements on the 
defence to disclose the details of its case, prior to trial, has the potential to hamper fair trial rights, 
namely the privilege against self-incrimination, the presumption of innoĐeŶĐe, aŶd the pƌoseĐutioŶ͛s 
burden of proof at trial. This is primarily a consequence of the assistance which obligatory disclosure can 
provide to the prosecution in establishing its case. However, the appropriate limit of fair trial rights is a 
contentious issue. Whilst the privilege against self-incrimination, presumption of innocence and burden 
of proof are all aspects of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), Article 6 is not absolute. The European Court of Human Rights has restricted the 
potentially broad applicability of certain fair trial rights,44 sometimes on the basis of public interest 
factors.45  This has oĐĐuƌƌed despite AƌtiĐle ϲ ďeiŶg a ͚stƌoŶg͛ ƌight, iŶ that it is Ŷot suďjeĐt to aŶǇ eǆpliĐit 




GiǀeŶ the EuƌopeaŶ Couƌt͛s appƌoaĐh, it is likelǇ that the disĐlosuƌe ƌegiŵe would be upheld as 
compliant with Article 6. However, this section takes a broad approach to fair trial rights which may go 
beyond that afforded to them under the ECHR. It is underpinned by the proposition that the state 
should account for the accusations of criminal wrongdoing that it brings against its citizens without the 
co-opted assistance of the accused. Whilst this proposition is not explored in detail here, it is grounded 
in the autonomy and dignity which should be afforded to citizens in a liberal democracy, and the need to 
regulate state power in order to prevent abuses of such power. It provides a basis for interpreting fair 
trial rights broadly, so as to prevent the defendant from being required to actively participate in a way 
which will assist the state in accounting for its accusations. 
  
To assume that it is legitimate to require the defendant to provide the prosecution with information 
that may assist them in securing his conviction sits uneasily with the privilege against self-incrimination. 
Subject to interpretation of its scope, the privilege means that a suspect cannot be required to provide 
the authorities with information that might be used against him in a criminal trial.47 Disclosure may lead 
to incrimination by establishing the actus reus through a defence, such as self-defence. This situation 
arose in Firth48 which concerned a charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. During a committal 
hearing, the prosecution were allowed to rely on a case progression form prepared by the defence when 
the allegatioŶ ǁas oŶe of ĐoŵŵoŶ assault. The foƌŵ stated that ͚OŶlǇ ĐoŶtaĐt ǁas ŵade iŶ self 
defeŶĐe͛. This ǁas held to aŵouŶt to eǀideŶĐe of aĐĐeptaŶĐe that the defendant was involved in a 
physical encounter with the complainant. Since the defence submitted at the hearing that there was no 
case to answer, as there was no identification evidence, the earlier disclosure assisted the prosecution in 
strengthening, if not establishing, its case. However, this decision has been complicated by the more 
recent case of Newell49 in which it was held that, although a statement in a Plea and Case Management 
Hearing Form was admissible at trial against the defendant, the judge should have used his discretion 
under s.78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to exclude it.  
 
The charge in Newell was possession of cocaine with intent to supply. On the form, the defence had 
ǁƌitteŶ ͚Ŷo possessioŶ͛, ǁheƌeas iŶ a lateƌ defeŶĐe statement, and at trial, the defence admitted 
possession, but denied intent to supply. The prosecution had used the earlier form to show the 
inconsistency and rely on it as evidence of guilt. As a consequence of this case, judges should use their 
discretion to exclude evidence against the defendant in Plea and Case Management Hearing Forms in 
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the CƌoǁŶ Couƌt aŶd Tƌial PƌepaƌatioŶ Foƌŵs iŶ the ŵagistƌates͛ Đouƌt. Hoǁeǀeƌ, this is oŶ the ĐoŶditioŶ 
that the defeŶĐe haǀe folloǁed the ͚letteƌ aŶd spiƌit of the CƌiŵiŶal PƌoĐeduƌe ‘ules͛.50 This means that 
directly incriminating evidence from such forms can be rightly admitted where the defence have failed 
to comply with case management directions, or have attempted to ambush the prosecution, or perhaps 
even failed to provide a defence statement, as required by the CPIA. One of the reasons why the Court 
felt that the evidence should have been excluded in this case was because the defendant had provided a 
defence statement which made the case clear, and had been the subject of an adverse inference 
direction due to late disclosure of the statement.51 This sanction was thought sufficient, and this was a 
case where there had been no disadvantage to the Crown. However, because this case concerned the 
use of case management forms rather than defence statements, it remains open for incriminating or 
inconsistent information contained in defence statements to be used against the defendant as part of 
the prosecution case; the defendant may face cross-examination on the content of the statement and 
become the subject of adverse comment and inferences.  
 
The Royal Commission rejected the objection that defence disclosure infringes the privilege against self-
incrimination, on the basis that disclosure of the substance of the defence case at an earlier stage will no 
more incriminate the defendant nor help prove the case against him than it does when it is given in 
evidence at the hearing.52 The Commission believed that the matter was simply one of timing.53 
However, even where disclosure does not directly incriminate the accused, it may lead the police or 
prosecution to uncover incriminating information. In this way, the defendant will have assisted the 
prosecution in incriminating him. For example, details of defence witnesses disclosed under s.6C will 
provide material for investigation, and may lead to defence witnesses changing their evidence, or 
incriminating the defendant.54 Section 6C came into force in 2010 and, whilst it is not likely to lead to 
routine interviewing of defence witnesses, Zander is of the opinion that giving the police the power to 
iŶflueŶĐe ǁitŶesses is itself aŶ iŶǀitatioŶ to poisoŶ the ǁell ďǇ ͚uŶdue iŶflueŶĐe͛, as theǇ ŶatuƌallǇ ǁaŶt 
to get the evidence that will convict the defendant.55 To claim that the defendant is not being compelled 
to saǇ aŶǇthiŶg iŶĐƌiŵiŶatiŶg has ďeeŶ desĐƌiďed as ͚Ŷaïǀe͛. 56 To require the defendant to identify that 
which is in dispute inevitably involves his having to admit that which is not in dispute and can contribute 
directly to the discovery of incriminating information. A clear notion of the scope and rationale of the 
privilege against self-incrimination might help to determine how far the defence disclosure obligations 
interfere with it in practice. To embark on such a task is beyond the scope of this article.57 Suffice it to 
point out that, since the privilege against self-incrimination provides the accused with a specific right not 
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to assist in the criminal process, it could be argued that a broad interpretation of its scope should be 
applied such that it is contrary to the privilege to require the defendant to disclose information which 
can result in incrimination.  
 
Linked to the implications which the disclosure obligations may have for the privilege against self-
incrimination are concerns for their impact on the presumption of innocence. While an examination of 
the limits and rationale of the presumption of innocence is also beyond the scope of this article,58 a 
broad interpretation of the presumption should operate as a direction to treat the accused as if he were 
innocent throughout the criminal process, until guilt has been established. To treat him as innocent is to 
treat him as if he had nothing to account for. Rather, the state should account for the accusations of 
criminal wrongdoing which it has brought against him. The presumption of innocence allows the 
accused to challenge the state and hold it to account before it can exert its powers of condemnation and 
punishment.59 The accused should not have to actively ĐoŶtƌiďute iŶ the disĐhaƌge of the state͛s 
obligation to prove guilt, either expressly or in consequence of a procedural requirement. Requiring the 
defence to supply even potentially incriminating information is not in the spirit of this broad conception 
of the presumption of innocence. The defence disclosure obligations also compromise a narrower 
iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of the pƌesuŵptioŶ of iŶŶoĐeŶĐe, ǁhiĐh siŵplǇ ƌefleĐts the pƌoseĐutioŶ͛s ďuƌdeŶ of 
proof. 
 
Although the prosecution must prove its case at trial beyond a reasonable doubt, the disclosure regime 
has an impact on the burden of proof, through its potential to assist the prosecution in discharging that 
burden. Richardson has argued that, because it is for the prosecution to adduce evidence to establish all 
the elements of the offence charged and show why the defendant is guilty, the imposition of an 
obligation on the defendant to say why he is not guilty immediately eases the burden on the 
prosecution.60 The defendant should not be co-opted iŶto easiŶg the pƌoseĐutioŶ͛s ďuƌdeŶ, oƌ helpiŶg to 
discharge it. This may not always be the case in practice. Nevertheless, early indication of the proposed 
defence case can be used to improve the prosecution case even if it is not intended to help establish it; 
the defence becomes an object of investigation, and the prosecution case is reinforced as a result.61 
Furthermore, since the defence statement is deemed to be given by the defendant, he can be cross-
examined on it. Arguably, this assistance, even if inadvertent, undermines the presumption of innocence 
and the burden of proof.62 It also takes defence disclosure beyond its original efficiency-driven purposes 




It is significant that the disclosure regime has less regard for these rights than might be expected in an 
adversarial system. IŶ )aŶdeƌ͛s ǀieǁ, ǁith the ͚ƌeasoŶaďle eǆĐeptioŶs͛ of disĐlosuƌe of aliďi aŶd eǆpeƌt 
eǀideŶĐe, ͚it is ǁƌoŶg to ƌeƋuiƌe the defendant to be helpful by giving advance notice of his defence and 
to peŶalise hiŵ ďǇ adǀeƌse ĐoŵŵeŶt if he fails to do so.͛63  This critique of defence disclosure reflects a 
͚Ŷo-assistaŶĐe͛ appƌoaĐh to the defeŶdaŶt͛s ƌole iŶ the ĐƌiŵiŶal pƌoĐess, within which he must not be 
required to actively participate in a way that may assist the prosecution in establishing their case. A 
stƌiĐt ͚Ŷo-assistaŶĐe͛ appƌoaĐh, ďased oŶ a ďƌoad iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of the pƌesuŵptioŶ of iŶŶoĐeŶĐe aŶd 
the burden of proof, would ensure that the state can account for the accusations of criminal wrongdoing 
that it makes against the accused. It would remove the requirement for the defendant to disclose any 
details of his defence, including alibi and expert evidence. If the state cannot make a case without the 
defeŶĐe͛s help, it should Ŷot ďƌiŶg a Đase to tƌial. Likeǁise, if the prosecution cannot anticipate a 
defence, its case deserves to fail. Although this claim may appear brazen, it is not necessarily 
unreasonable. Prior to the CPIA, in the vast majority of cases, the prosecution were able to anticipate 
the defence and were seldom successfully ambushed.64 However, it has been argued that this absolutist 
position goes too far by permitting defence tactics specifically designed to throw the prosecution off 
balance.65 Redmayne believes that ambush defences cannot be justified in that manner, and that the 
system has no reason to accommodate tactics designed to gain illegitimate acquittals.66 He contends 
that the aďsolutist ͚Ŷo-assistance͛ positioŶ ĐaŶ ďe ŵodified to ŵake it ŵoƌe attƌaĐtiǀe, by distinguishing 
two different ways in which the defence can assist the prosecution. Whilst knowing something about 
the defence that will be presented may help the prosecution to anticipate attacks on its case at trial, 
disclosure of the defence case will not necessarily help the prosecution establish a prima facie case. If, 
then, the principle is that the defence should not have to assist the prosecution to make its prima facie 
case, there would be no objection to disclosure of alibis and the like.67 
 
However, as Redmayne recognises, there is no guarantee that disclosure will not assist the prosecution 
in establishing its case.68 Disclosure of a defence, such as self-defence or duress, may help the 
prosecution establish the actus reus, and even the disclosure of an alibi may assist the prosecution by 
providing the police with a time-fƌaŵe of the defeŶdaŶt͛s ǁheƌeaďouts aŶd ŵoǀeŵeŶts.  ‘edŵaǇŶe 
argues that the possibility of disclosure helping the prosecution make a prima facie case can be rectified 
ǁith the ŵodified ͚Ŷo-assistaŶĐe͛ appƌoaĐh, by preventing the prosecution from using the fruits of 
disclosure as part of its case in chief.69 This may be difficult to apply in practice and, again, there is no 
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guarantee that the defence disclosure has not provided assistance to the prosecution in establishing its 
case. For example, it may afford prosecution witnesses with an opportunity to tailor their evidence to 
the defence disclosed. Whilst the possibility of tailored evidence is an important issue in itself, it is 
presented here only as aŶ eǆaŵple of hoǁ eǀeŶ a ŵodified ͚Ŷo-assistaŶĐe͛ appƌoaĐh to disĐlosuƌe ĐaŶ 
assist the prosecution. On the possibility of tailored evidence, Edwards highlights the example of a plain-
clothes police officer in the case of a youth who hits the officer during a stop and search. Disclosing that 
the defence will rely on the fact that the officer did not identify himself by documentation, as required 
under s.2(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, will allow the officer to ensure that he 
mentions this fact in his evidence.70   
 
In practice, the courts have not made a clear distinction between using information disclosed by the 
defence to anticipate attacks on the prosecutioŶ͛s Đase aŶd usiŶg it to estaďlish a prima facie case 
against the defendant. As a result of Firth71 and Newell,72 at least where it can be said that the defence 
have not followed the letter and spirit of the Criminal Procedure Rules, the fruits of disclosure can be 
used as evidence to establish a prima facie case. Moreover, such cases as Essa73 and Haynes74 show that 
the prosecution are able to cross-examine the defendant on disclosure failures pursuant to the CPIA, 
even where the defendant denies responsibility for the failure. Although concessions to a ͚Ŷo-assistaŶĐe͛ 
approach will always be made, it is important that, iŶ ƌeƋuiƌiŶg the defeŶdaŶt͛s paƌtiĐipatioŶ, pƌoĐeduƌal 
rights designed to ensure fairness are not compromised. Whilst the defence disclosure regime is unlikely 
to be found to be in breach of Article 6 of the ECHR, the protective force of the privilege against self-
iŶĐƌiŵiŶatioŶ, the pƌesuŵptioŶ of iŶŶoĐeŶĐe aŶd the pƌoseĐutioŶ͛s ďuƌdeŶ of pƌoof has ďeen reduced. 
These allow the state to be held to account for the accusations of criminal wrongdoing that it brings 
against its citizens before subjecting them to official condemnation and punishment. They are also 
important elements of an adversarial system and give the defendant the freedom to choose whether or 
not to participate. The defence disclosure regime undermines this freedom.  
 
 
Implications for criminal procedure 
 
Owing to the long-standing general principle which placed no obligation upon the defence to disclose its 
case before trial, it is understandable that some see a defence non-disclosure norm as being an intrinsic 
part of the adversarial system.75 However, even in the height of English adversarialism in the nineteenth 
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and twentieth centuries, although prosecution disclosure became important,76 defence non-disclosure 
was not in itself essential. Nonetheless, in the light of the wider impact of requiring defence 
participation, imposing obligations on the defence to provide the prosecution with the details of their 
case interferes with norms which are associated with adversarialism. These norms tend to allow the 
defendant to take a passive role and enable him to choose whether or not to participate. They allow the 
prosecution to be put to proof and the pƌoseĐutioŶ͛s Đase to ďe tested. EŵphasisiŶg the defeŶdaŶt͛s 
new participatory role through the assumption that defence statements have been given with his 
authority,77 and through suggestions that the court should press for his involvement personally,78 also 
has an impact on adversarialism, by focussing on the defendant as an individual and detracting from the 
defeŶĐe͛s ƌole as a paƌtǇ.79 Consequently, although defence non-disclosure is not an essential aspect of 
adversarialism, in terms of the increased participatory requirements on the defendant and the defence, 
the current regime has undoubtedly contributed to a shift away from an adversarial system.  
 
Requiring the defence to disclose its case prior to trial might indicate a move towards a truth-oriented, 
or inquisitorial, model of criminal procedure. However, whilst defence disclosure has been conceived of 
as a means of improving truth-finding, prosecution non-disclosure presents a greater threat to truth-
finding than defence non-disclosure. Because the CPIA reduced the prosecution͛s disclosure obligations, 
it is in some conflict with the idea of inquisitorialism. Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, ŵodeƌŶ ͚iŶƋuisitoƌial͛ tǇpe 
jurisdictions, such as France, neither require defence disclosure, nor do they attach penalties for the 
defeŶĐe͛s failuƌe to disĐlose eǀideŶĐe.80 The CPIA is not consistent with common practice in continental 
systems which often rely on a written dossier of all evidence discovered during the judicial investigation, 
accessible to both the prosecution and defence.81 If England is not moving towards an inquisitorial 
model, then the disclosure regime might seem to be indicative of a move towards a managerial model of 
criminal procedure which prioritises efficiency at the expense of fairness and due process.82 The focus 
on case management and eliminating surprise at trial suggests the new approach to criminal procedure 
is efficiency driven.  
 
However, the result of the defence disclosure regime, along with other participatory requirements now 
placed on the defendant, is a participation-focused model of criminal procedure, because it relies on the 
participation of the defeŶĐe aŶd eŵphasises the defeŶdaŶt͛s paƌtiĐipatoƌǇ ƌole. The focus of the 
participatory model is on the perceived benefits of participation. In the case of disclosure, these benefits 
relate to both efficiency and truth-finding. This is a significant consequence of the disclosure regime 
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since the new participatory model of procedure has less regard for rights often considered essential to 
ensure a fair trial. When the system becomes less concerned with upholding principles and more 
concerned with efficiency and convictions, there is greater leeway to open the defendant up to 
participatory requirements. The defence disclosure regime has, therefore, affected both the role of the 
defendant and the defence as participants in the criminal process, as well as the nature of criminal 
procedure. In spite of its shortcomings, it seems that the participatory model of criminal procedure will 
continue to develop. For example, the Review of Disclosure in Criminal Proceedings has proposed that a 
constructive defence approach to disclosure issues should be seen and encouraged as pƌofessioŶal ͚ďest 





It is clear how requirements for the defence to disclose the nature of their case, prior to trial, fit into and 
contribute to the changing nature of criminal procedure and the participatory role of the defendant and 
the defence. In practice, the defence disclosure obligations are not always complied with, and 
defendants are not always penalised as a result. However, the CPIA has had a significant impact on 
criminal procedure. It has imposed upon the defendant new participatory requirements and, together 
with the Criminal Procedure Rules, has created expectations of constructive participation. In so doing, it 
has the potential to hamper fair trial rights, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, the 
presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof. The problem with the disclosure regime is not so 
much that it is moving us on from adversarialism, but that it is also moving us away from these 
procedural rights and fairness norms which work as part of an adversarial system. Once we recognise 
the significance which the defence disclosure obligations have had for the nature of criminal procedure, 
we must decide whether to abandon them or change how we define and understand our system. This 
includes recognising the emergence of a participatory model of procedure which lacks procedural 
protection for the accused. 
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